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Abstract Quasilinear preferences on a public good and a numeraire good are limits
of preferences where both goods are normal. The set of equilibria of the voluntary con-
tribution (or private provision) game is easily characterized under quasilinearity by:
top valuators aggregately contribute their common stand-alone contribution, whereas
non-top valuators contribute nothing. Because, as long as preferences are randomly
selected, there will typically be a single top valuator, it follows that, typically, the equi-
librium is unique, with all players but one contributing nothing, hence “free riding” in
the sense of the ordinary English usage of the expression. The upper-hemicontinuity
of the Nash equilibrium correspondence implies that this is also the case when both
goods are strictly normal, but the wealth effects on the public good are small.
Keywords Free riding · Public goods · Voluntary contributions · Private provision ·
Normal goods · Quasilinear preferences · Wealth effects
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1 Free riding
The terms free rider and free riding are frequently used both in economics and in
ordinary English speech. “Free rider” has been present in economics at least since
Buchanan (1964) with the following meaning: the free-rider problem is defined as
the inefficiency of the outcome of a scheme to supply a public good by voluntary
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contribution. Hence, the free rider problem is particular case of the inefficiency of
laissez-faire in the presence of externalities. A “free rider” in this context is somebody
who does not take account of the effects of her actions on other people. Note that
every participant in the usual game of voluntary contributions to public goods is a free
rider in this sense, because even if a person does contribute a positive amount, her
contribution would be larger if she took into account the positive externality that she
generates. Because inefficiency is bad, “free riding” has a clear negative connotation
in the economics discourse.
The meaning is somewhat different in the common English usage of the expression:
a “free rider” is somebody who benefits from something without paying. The Oxford
English Dictionary attests the term “ride” from 1886 the sense of a “rider” as “A pas-
senger, esp. one using public transport.” “Free rider” appears in the legal literature
at the turn of the 19th century in reference to not-paying passengers in trains, both
with and without the authorization of the railroad, and in the 1930’s for hitchhikers.
The term did not necessarily have a negative connotation in its earlier usage: it could
perfectly apply to a VIP who was a guest of the railroad company.1
Here I use “free rider” in the sense of the ordinary English usage, i.e., as a person who
contributes nothing. Granted, the discussion is framed by the voluntary contribution
game where the equilibrium is indeed inefficient. But my focus is the characterization
of who pays and who does not, rather than efficiency.
2 The model
Let there be a finite number of players, numbered i = 1, . . . , I, and let I also denote the
set of players. For i = 1, . . . , I , Player i’s utility function is denoted ui : + × Mi →
 : (y, mi ), → ui (y, mi ), where Mi ⊂ , y is the amount of the public good, and
mi ∈ Mi is the amount of a private, numeraire good. Player i is endowed with ωi units
of numeraire, and decides on her contribution ti towards the supply of the public good.
We require ti to be nonnegative. Given a tuple (t∗1 , . . . , t∗I ), we define the supply of





A Nash equilibrium of the voluntary contribution (or private provision) game is
a tuple (t∗1 , . . . , t∗I ) ∈ I+ of contributions such that, for each i ∈ I, t∗i maximizes
ui (t∗−i + ti , ωi − ti ) subject to ti ≥ 0.
Let (t∗1 , . . . , t∗I ) be an equilibrium. We say that i is a contributor at (t∗1 , . . . , t∗I )
if t∗i > 0. If, on the contrary, t∗i = 0, then we say that, at (t∗1 , . . . , t∗I ), i is a non
contributor or that i free rides.
3 Normality
It is well known that when both the public good and the private good are normal
(positive wealth effects) the following properties hold (Warr 1983; Bergstrom et al.
1986, 1992; Andreoni 1988; Fraser 1992; Buchholz et al. 2006a,b).
1 See Silvestre (2008), where the difficulties in translating the “free rider” into other languages are
discussed.
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(1) Uniqueness (Bergstrom et al. 1986, Theorems 2–3): There is a unique Nash equi-
librium, which implies a unique tuple of consumption vectors.
(2) Warr neutrality (Warr 1983; Bergstrom et al. 1986): A redistribution of wealth
among contributors does not change the equilibrium consumption vectors.
4 Quasilinearity
4.1 Assumptions
Quasilinearity assumption. Mi =  and ui (y, mi ) = vi (y) + mi , for some function
vi : + → .
Remark 1 Postulating Mi =  guarantees the global absence of wealth effects (see,
e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Alternatively, as it is frequently done, one can assume
that Mi = + and that ωi is “high enough,” which here requires ωi to exceed i’s
“stand-alone contribution,” defined below.
We may variously refer to vi (y) as i’s valuation of, benefit from, or willingness to
pay for y units of the public good. Accordingly, when vi (y) is differentiable, vi ′(y) is
the marginal valuation of (or benefit from, or willingness to pay for) the public good
at y. Note that if the free disposal of the public good is postulated, then vi cannot be
decreasing anywhere.
Single peakedness assumption. The function bi : + →  : bi (y) = vi (y) − y is
single peaked, i.e., ∃yˆi ≥ 0 such that
bi (yˆi ) > bi (y) for all y ≥ 0,
if y0 < y1 < yˆi , then bi (y
1) > bi (y
0),
if yˆi < y
0 < y1, then bi (y
0) > bi (y
1).
Under the single-peakedness assumption we call yˆi i’s stand-alone contribution.
Note that the single peakedness assumption holds if and only if bi is strictly quasi-
concave and has a maximizer.
The single-peakedness assumption is satisfied by most, if not all, valuation func-
tions used in the modeling of the private provision game. It is in particular satisfied
in the popular case where vi is strictly concave, continuous at y = 0 and bounded. It
is also satisfied when vi is continuous, increasing and strictly concave on an interval
[0, y¯] and constant on (y¯,∞) : the amount y¯ is then a satiation level of the public
good, and a free disposal postulate makes the valuation function constant above y¯.
Given an profile of I quasilinear preferences, define the set of top valuators as
T ≡ {i ∈ I : yˆi ≥ yˆh,∀h ∈ I }, and the top valuation as yˆ ≡ yˆi , for any i ∈ T . Quasi-
linearity implies that whether i is a top valuator or not depends only on the profile of
preferences, and not on the vector of individual endowments of the numeraire good.
4.2 Characterization of the Nash equilibrium
Proposition Under quasilinearity and single peakedness (t∗1 , . . . , t∗1 ) is a Nash equi-
librium if and only if it is nonnegative and satisfies
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(a) t∗ = yˆ;
(b) i /∈ T ⇒ t∗i = 0.
Proof (Straightforward; offered for self-containment.) We first show that (a) and (b)
imply that (t∗1 , . . . , t∗1 ) is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose not, i.e., there is a player i and
a ti ≥ 0 such that vi (t∗−i + ti ) + ωi − ti > vi (t∗) + ωi − t∗i , i.e.,
vi (t
∗−i + ti ) + ωi − t∗−i − ti > vi (t∗) + ωi − t∗−i − t∗i . (1)
Because, by (a), t∗ is the stand-alone contribution of a top valuator, (1) cannot hold
for i ∈ T .
So let i 	∈ T, which implies that i ′s stand-alone’s contribution is strictly less than
the stand-alone contribution of a top valuator, i.e.,yˆi < yˆ = t∗ = t∗−i (by (a) and (b)).
Therefore yˆi < t∗−i ≤ t∗−i + t ′, yet bi (t∗−i + ti ) > bi (t∗−i ) (by (1)), contradicting the
single peakedness of bi .
Conversely, let (t∗1 , . . . , t∗1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. To prove (a), assume, by con-
tradiction, that t∗ 	= yˆ. If t∗ < yˆ, then choose a top valuator i, in which case vi (yˆ) −
yˆ > vi (t∗) − t∗, i.e., vi (t∗−i + yˆ − t∗−i ) + t∗−i − yˆ > vi (t∗−i + t∗i ) + t∗−i − t∗i ,
or writing ti ≡ yˆ − t∗−i , we have that ti > 0 (because yˆ > t∗ ≥ t∗−i ) and that
vi (t∗−i + ti ) − ti > vi (t∗−i + t∗i ) − t∗i , contradicting the assumption that (t∗1 , . . . , t∗1 )
is a Nash equilibrium. If t∗ > yˆ, then let i be any player for whom t∗i > 0. Define
ε ≡ min{t∗i , t∗− yˆi }, positive because yˆi ≤ yˆ < t∗, and consider ti ≡ t∗i −ε ∈ [0, t∗i ),
i.e., yˆi ≤ t∗−i + ti and t∗−i +ti < t∗−i +t∗i . By single peakedness, vi (t∗−i +ti )−(t∗−i +ti ) >
vi (t∗−i +t∗i )−(t∗−i +t∗i ), i.e., vi (t∗−i +ti )+ωi −ti > vi (t∗−i +t∗i )+ωi −t∗i , contradicting
the assumption that (t∗1 , . . . , t∗1 ) is a Nash equilibrium. This proves (a).
To prove (b), let i /∈ T and t∗i > 0. Again, define ε ≡ min{t∗i , t∗ − yˆi }, positive
because yˆi < yˆ = t∗( by (a)), and proceed as in the previous paragraph. unionsq
Remark 2 The result is intuitive. Let vi (y) be differentiable with v′′i (y) < 0 (or
differentiable on [0, y¯] with v′′i (y) < 0 on [0, y¯) and v′i (y) = 0 on (y¯,∞). Then
b′i (y) ≡ v′i (y) − 1 is i’s marginal net valuation of her contribution and yˆi is defined
by b′i (yˆi ) ≤ 0 with b′i (yˆi )yˆi = 0. Let yˆ > 0. If i is a top contributor, then b′i (yˆ) = 0,
whereas if not, then b′i (yˆ) < 0. But these are essentially the Kuhn–Tucker conditions
of the Nash equilibrium.
4.3 Single and multiple top valuators
It follows from the Proposition that, in the single-top-valuator case (the set T is a sin-
gleton), there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Provided that preferences are randomly
selected among a rich enough set of quasilinear preferences, this is the typical situation.
There is then a single contributor, and everybody else free rides.
If, on the contrary, and more exceptionally, we are in the multiple-top-valuator
case, then the equilibrium contributions of top valuators are undetermined as long as
they add up to yˆ.
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Fig. 1 The equilibrium correspondence as the wealth effect tends to zero. Example 1: Two players with
identical preferences
5 Comparison between normality and quasilinearity
Quasilinear preferences are limits of preferences where both goods are normal as the
wealth effects on the public good tend to zero. It is therefore instructive to compare
the properties of the model with positive wealth effects, listed in Sect.3 above, with
the corresponding ones in the limiting, quasilinear case.
(1) Uniqueness. The amount of the public good is uniquely determined both under nor-
mality and quasilinearity. But the equilibrium allocation, unique under normality,
displays a degree of indeterminacy in the quasilinear, multiple-top-valuator case.
This implies that, if we take a sequence of profiles of normal preferences that con-
verge to a quasilinear, multiple-top-valuator profile of preferences, the equilibrium
correspondence is not lower hemicontinuous. Example 1 illustrates: two identical
individuals with ωi = 10, and a sequence of utility functions of the form √y +
mai , i = 1, 2, where the sequence of a′s is increasing and tends to one. Figure 1
graphs the equilibrium correspondence: the thick line indicates the contribution of
one of the players, whereas the dotted line indicates the amount of the public good.
(2) Warr neutrality. In the single-top-valuator case, Warr neutrality trivially holds.
In the multiple-top-valuator case, the set of equilibrium private-good consump-
tions is no longer invariant with respect to wealth redistributions among top
valuators. But a version of Warr neutrality holds, namely that of Theorem 1 in
123
206 SERIEs (2012) 3:201–207
Bergstrom et al. (1986), stating that after the redistribution, there is a new Nash
equilibrium in which every player changes the amount of her contribution by
precisely the change in her wealth.
6 Free riding at positive wealth effects
The form of free riding present in the quasilinear, single-top-valuator case, where
all but one player contribute nothing, does not necessarily occur with normal pref-
erences, possibly excepting large numbers of players or widely different preferences
(see Andreoni 1988; Buchholz et al. 2006a). But it does typically occur when the
wealth effects on the public good are positive but small.
Indeed, consider a sequence of differentiable, strictly quasiconcave normal
economies converging to a quasilinear economy with a single top valuator. If i is
a non-top-valuator at the limit, then b′i (y) < 0 there (Remark 2), and, because of the
upper-hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991;
see also Kohlberg and Mertens 1986), it must be the case that ∂ui /∂y
∂ui /∂mi
− 1 < 0 as the
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Fig. 2 The equilibrium correspondence as the wealth effect tends to zero: Example 2: Two players with
different preferences
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sequence approaches its limit and wealth effects on the public good are positive but
small. Hence, there will be a single contributor for small enough wealth effects.
This is a general observation, which applies to any number of players, and any
nonzero degree of preference differentiation. Example 2 illustrates: two players, each
endowed with 10 units of numeraire. Player 1’s utility function is 2
√
y + ma1, and
Player 2’s is
√
y + ma2 . Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium correspondence as a tends to
one: For high enough a (in Example 2, for a > 0.53), Player 1 is the only contributor,
and Player 2 free rides.
7 Conclusion
When the wealth effects on the public good are small, as long as preferences are ran-
domly selected, the presumption is that only one player contributes, whereas all the
other players contribute nothing to the provision of the public good. The behavior
of the non contributing players constitute “free riding” in the strong sense that the
expression has in ordinary English usage. This result is independent from the number
of players: it applies to both small and large numbers.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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